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Spain faces the highest unemployment rate among the European Union
countries (22.2%), and Portugal one of the lowest (7.3%). However, superficially,
these two countries share common labour market features: they both have the most
stringent job security rules in the OECD, the architecture of their bargaining systems
appears identical, and the generosity of their unemployment insurance systems seems,
after 1989, roughly comparable. We address this puzzle by providing a systematic
comparison of the Portuguese and Spanish labour market institutions, in particular,
job security, unemployment benefits and the system of wage bargaining. In addition,
we empirically analyse the Spanish and Portuguese unemployment out-flows and
conditional wage distributions using micro data for both countries. We find that there
are differences in unemployment benefits (non-existent in Portugal until 1985, and
less generous nowadays), differences in wage flexibility (wage floors by category
established by collective agreements are set at a lower relative level in Portugal), and,
in practice higher firing costs in Spain. We conclude that a key factor in explaining
the difference in Portuguese and Spanish unemployment rates since the late seventies
is the wage adjustment process. Such process would have been less sustainable
without generous benefits, but given the way union rules developed in Spain, we do
not regard their role in the wage setting process as just a consequence of the large
unemployment benefits.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we provide a systematic comparison of the Portuguese and
Spanish labour markets during the 1980s and 1990s. We do so by firstly looking in
detail at the differences between the labour market institutions of the two countries,
and, secondly, by empirically analysing the Spanish and Portuguese unemployment
outflows and wage distributions using comparable individual-level data for both
countries.
Aside from their similarities in history and culture, the labour market
institutions of Portugal and Spain are apparently more similar than those of any other
pair of European countries. Yet, their unemployment rates are dramatically different.
In both countries the unemployment rate began to increase during the seventies,
rising to around 7% in 1978. During the years 1978-1985, the unemployment rate
rose on average at a much higher speed in Spain, to over 20%, whereas in Portugal it
reached just over 10%. Since then the profile of both series has been very similar but
at very different levels.
1
There are few studies that address this puzzle, and so far there has not been a
definite explanation of the factors that are at the root of such different unemployment
performance. Blanchard and Jimeno (1995) conclude that the only difference between
the two countries appears to be the unemployment benefit system but that was more
so in the past than at present.
In this paper we argue that behind the apparent similarity in the various
aggregate indicators of labour institutions employed in cross-country comparisons,
there are significant institutional differences between the two countries. Finding them
should be helpful for our understanding of unemployment in general, beyond the
specific features of Portuguese and Spanish unemployment.
                                                
1 For some selected labour market indicators see Table 1A.2
There has recently been an important surge of cross-sectional and panel data
cross-country studies with the aim of investigating empirically the determinants of
'average' (or structural) unemployment. In those studies Portugal and Spain appear as
outliers. They are largely unable to explain, for example, why in 1996 the
unemployment rate in Portugal was 7.3%, while in Spain it was 22.2%. Even at the
peak of the cycle during the second half of the 1980's (with GDP growth reaching
5.6%) unemployment in Spain was always over16%. This situation illustrates some
of the limitations of the existing cross-country comparisons based on aggregate data
and very stylised institutional indicators.
The theoretical framework behind such empirical cross-country studies is a
simple model of equilibrium in the labour market as in Layard et al. (1991). In these
studies attention is paid to the relationship between the unemployment rate (usually
some average across a number of years to eliminate the effects of the business cycle)
and the labour market institutions in the different countries as proxied by an array of
measures and indicators.
As an illustration of the results in these studies, we report in Table 1B the
estimates presented in Nickell (1997), together with the values of the explanatory
variables for Portugal and Spain. In his conclusions, among the labour market
institutions, Nickell stresses the role of the generosity of benefits and the extent to
which wages are determined collectively (coupled with the degree of employers and
unions co-ordination). Spain could be thought to fit the observed statistically
significant effects, except for its low degree of union density (11.0%). But strikingly
Portugal looks pretty similar as well, although coupled with a much lower
unemployment rate. One surprising difference is its much higher union density
(almost three times the value for Spain) which, according to the estimates, should be
generating more unemployment, not less!
On the same lines, Scarpeta (1996) specifies an equation in which cross-
country differences in unemployment rates in the OECD are explained using a small3
number of explanatory variables: unemployment benefits, job security, union density,
and employer co-ordination. However, despite the goodness of fit of Scarpeta's
specification, the magnitude of the regression residuals for Portugal and Spain
remained very large (the two largest country-specific effects). In fact, the estimated
model would severely underestimate the Spanish unemployment rate and
overestimate the Portuguese one.
International studies based on country-level data suffer from various
limitations due to aggregation. In the first place, when employing generic quantitative
indicators of a possibly complex phenomenon, the outcome may be misleading. For
example, the OECD 31.8% union density measure for Portugal is basically due to the
fact that union membership is close to 100% in sectors where unions have the
monopoly of providing a health support system. Furthermore, country indicators
frequently take the form of relative rankings whose use in linear regression models is
suspect. More importantly, it is often difficult to achieve agreement on these
rankings, and the disagreements tend to have considerable implications on the results.
An example is the debate between Bruno and Sachs (1985) and Calmfors and Driffil
(1988) on the linear vs. non-linear nature of the relationship between centralised
institutions and performance, which hinges on the different rankings of certain
economies (see Metcalf, 1994).
Another problem of working with aggregate data is that aggregation may
aggravate the endogeneity of explanatory variables. Labour market institutions and
policies are often taken as exogenous in cross-country studies of the determinants of
unemployment, but the possibility of reverse causation is always present (Lazear,
1990).
Finally, the use of aggregate data as opposed to individual data may mask
interactions between individual and institutional characteristics, giving rise to biases
or the cancellation of interesting effects. Since handling individual data for many
countries at a time may not be feasible, several recent studies have targeted two or4
three countries for close comparisons.
2 In this regard, this paper shows the usefulness
for understanding the structural aspects of unemployment of a close comparison of
the Portuguese and Spanish labour markets, using detailed institutional information
and individual microdata from the two countries.
Following the Layard et al. (1991) model, in this paper we focus on the
functioning of the labour market institutions. Although the role of shocks cannot be
disregarded, the emphasis of the paper is on institutions, since Portugal and Spain
have been hit by broadly similar shocks during the last twenty years (Blanchard and
Jimeno, 1995, Castillo, Dolado, and Jimeno, 1998), and similar shocks combined
with differences in institutions may lead to very different unemployment outcomes
(see Blanchard, 1999, and Blanchard and Wolfers, 1999). In particular, we closely
compare job security regulation, the treatment of the unemployed (namely with
respect to unemployment benefits) and the system of wage bargaining.
Furthermore, we use microdata to study the impact of the two main
institutions thought to affect unemployment, the benefit system and the system of
wage setting, on individual unemployment behaviour and wage determination. In
particular, we study flows out of unemployment by estimating an econometric
transition model for each country to measure and compare the current effects of the
different factors affecting the probability of leaving unemployment. The data come
from the rotating panel of the Labour Force Survey in each country. We also estimate
individual wage equations and regressions for the conditional variance of individual
wages in order to analyze differences in returns and within-group dispersion between
the two countries. The data used come from a different Earnings Survey in each
country.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section II we start by comparing the
labour market legislation and labour market institutions in the two countries. In
Section III we offer a comparative analysis of participation, employment, and
                                                
2 For some recent labour market studies focussing on two-country comparisons using micro data see5
unemployment composition during the last two decades. In Section IV we study
flows out of unemployment using Portuguese and Spanish micro-data, and report the
estimates of the econometric transition model for each country. The comparison of
wage distributions between the two countries is presented in Section V as well as the
estimates of the individual wage equations and regressions for the conditional
variance. Finally, Section VI contains the conclusions of the paper.
                                                                                                                                          
for example Flinn (1997), Millner and Sieg (1997) and Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999).6
 II. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES
1. Employment Protection
Theoretically, higher firing costs have an ambiguous effect on overall
unemployment since they increase unemployment duration but reduce turnover.
Nonetheless, to have a complete picture of the functioning of the labour markets in
Portugal and Spain, a comparison of employment protection in both countries is
useful.
Employment protection regulations include those aspects that determine under
which conditions the termination of contracts may take place. Tables A1, A2 and A3
in the appendix show that the legal procedures to be followed in each country are
quite similar. Specifically, dismissal is tied to the existence of causes which the
employer must justify. Except in the case of disciplinary dismissal (a serious breach
of contract by the employee), the employer should provide the employee with
severance payment amounting to 20 days' wages per year worked, with a maximum
of 12 monthly payments in Spain, this being one month per year worked in Portugal
where, moreover, a minimum of three monthly payments is stipulated and no
maximum.
Employees in both countries may appeal against the decision to terminate
contract. But the incentives to do so differ greatly. In Portugal, the only possible
improvement for the employee is the possibility of reinstatement, which means that,
in practice, appeals are not usually lodged with the courts. In Spain, however, there is
the possibility that the dismissal may be declared unfair by the courts. In such case,
which arises when the firm is unable to provide a sufficient justification for the cause
of the dismissal, the cost of severance payments rises to 45 days per year worked with
a maximum of 42 monthly payments
3. The difficulty of justifying before the courts
                                                
3 The latest labour market reform in June 1997 has reduced severance payment for new contracts to 33
days per year worked with a maximum of 24 monthly payments, with the exception of employees aged
between 30 and 45 who have lost permanent jobs and have not been unemployed for longer than one year,7
the cause of the dismissal has, in practice, led in Spain to severance payments
equivalent to those for unfair dismissal which far exceed those in Portugal
4. In fact,
80% of the individual dismissal cases settled by the courts in 1996 resulted in a ruling
favourable to the employee, or were resolved via conciliation. Only in 20% of the
cases was the ruling favourable to the firm. Given these difficulties, most cases
(78%) are resolved before legal proceedings begin. This is done via an agreement
between the employee and the firm in which severance payments close to those for
unfair dismissal are agreed, this being the most likely alternative in the event of
arriving at legal proceedings. This situation may change after the recent labour
reform introduced in June 1997. The reform has extended the causes that may give
rise to an individual dismissal, and now includes the possibility of staff adjustments
with a view to overcoming problems relating to a lack of competitiveness. Insofar as
the bulk of dismissals now become "fair" ones following this reform, the firing costs
associated with permanent-contract employment in Spain will tend to be less than
those prevailing in Portugal, as is reflected in Figure A.1.
As for collective dismissals, the legislation in the two countries is very
similar. The most important point here is the need for administrative authorisation in
both countries. In view of this requirement, dismissal may in no circumstance be
declared unfair. Nonetheless, in the case of Spain administrative authorisation is only
given when there is agreement between the company and the unions. And such an
agreement is occasionally reached by increasing the amount of the severance
payments. Collective in proportion to total dismissals are a minority in both
countries: 14.5% in Portugal and 18.3% in Spain for 1996
5.
At the end of 1984, in an attempt to ease employment protection, new
                                                                                                                                          
for whom the severance payment remains as before.
4 These difficulties arise from the fact that dismissals are not subject to a simple formal control; judges
must delve into the matter, analysing whether there are economic, technological, organisational or
production-related causes. Economic causes are justified in the case of a current crisis of the firm, which
must be substantiated by audit and other technical reports. In practice, the firm must have been recording
continuous losses for a period of about two years. Technological, organisational or production-related
causes are justified on the basis of the need to shed staff to ensure the future viability of the firm and of
employment by means of a more suitable organisation of resources.8
fixed-term contracts with lower firing costs than the permanent contracts were
introduced in Spain, for all activities, whether temporary or not, and eliminating all
previous restrictions. In contrast, the legislative changes that occurred in Portugal in
1989 made fixed-term contracts more restrictive while maintaining severance pay
disbursements similar for temporary and permanent contracts.
In international comparisons, Portugal is conventionally classified as a
country with stricter employment protection laws than Spain
6, given the similarity of
the administrative procedures in the two countries and the higher cost of
compensation for dismissal in Portugal (one month per year worked). In practice,
employment protection for permanent employees is greater in Spain. The reason for
this is the difficulty of justifying the cause of dismissal before the courts, which
encourages firms to agree on severance payments to their employees equivalent to
those for unfair dismissal (45 days per year worked).
The recent labour market reform in Spain in June 1997 may entail a
significant reduction in severance payments, if the valid reference truly turns out to
be fair dismissal, which has a lower associated cost than that prevailing in Portugal
(20 days per year worked).
2. Unemployment Benefits
There have been important differences between Portugal and Spain in the
unemployment benefits regulations during the eighties and nineties. In Spain the
generosity of benefits increased (1984, 1989) and was subsequently reduced (1992) in
order to counter the expansion of spending (see García-Perea and Martín, 1996).
Between 1980 and 1993, unemployment coverage in Spain, driven by the growth of
assistance benefits, virtually doubled and rose to around 70% (see Figure 8). In
Portugal, before 1985 only unemployment assistance benefits existed covering less
than 10% of the jobless, and in 1985 unemployment insurance benefits were
                                                                                                                                          
5 Figures from the Labour Force Survey for Portugal and the Ministry of Labour in Spain.9
introduced. In 1989 eligibility criteria for the insurance benefit were eased and the
maximum duration period was increased, both for insurance and for assistance
benefits. The immediate outcome was a sharp increase in coverage, which tended to
widen as a result of the economic recession to rates of around 40 to 50 percent
maximum. Conversely, in Spain, there was an opposite-running movement following
the legislative change in 1992 which was aimed at reducing the replacement ratio and
tightening eligibility criteria. This was responsible for part of the reduction in the
coverage rate by about 15 percentage points, from 70% to almost 55%, still higher
than that prevailing in Portugal.
Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix draw together the eligibility conditions,
maximum duration and replacement ratio of the unemployment insurance and
assistance benefits. It may be concluded from the comparison between both countries
that the qualifying conditions in Portugal for the unemployment insurance benefit are
still stricter. Beneficiaries are required to have been contributing for at least 18
months during the past two years, whereas in Spain the requirement is 12 months'
contributions over the past six years.
The comparison is less direct as regards the maximum duration of the
insurance benefit. In Spain, this is linked to years of service in the job, whereas in
Portugal it depends on the age of the unemployed worker. As we can see from Tables
A6.1 and A6.2, the insurance system is seen to be more generous in Portugal, as from
1989,  for short years-of-service periods (between 18 months and three years), with
generosity increasing in step with the age of the unemployed worker. On the contrary,
the system is more generous in Spain for lengthy years-of-service periods, except for
workers aged 50 or over. Specifically, as from 6 years of completed service, the
insurance benefit is more generous in Spain for all workers under 50 years of age.
In both countries, to qualify for assistance benefits, the unemployed are
required not to have an income higher than a certain percentage of the minimum
                                                                                                                                          
6 See Grubb and Wells (1993) and OECD (1999).10
wage, the replacement rate being set in terms of the minimum wage. Generally,
assistance benefits are considerably more generous in Spain when the unemployed
worker has family responsibilities (see Tables A6.1 and A6.2).
The replacement ratio in Spain (70%) is higher than in Portugal (65%) during
the first six months' benefit, although the opposite is the case as from the seventh
month. Although the generosity of the level of benefits is usually only judged in
terms of the replacement ratio, another relevant aspect when assessing the generosity
of unemployment benefits, may be the level of the previous wages when those are
near subsistence levels. As we shall see in the next section, the distribution of low
wages shows notable differences in both economies. Generally, the level of the
average or median wage in Portugal is relatively low compared with Spain.
Furthermore, as we could see in the wage distributions in Figure 17, the average
benefit paid is higher up on the distribution in Portugal (25 percentile) as compared
to Spain (10 to 15 percentile) This may reflect the fact that individuals receiving
benefits in Portugal used to earn wages higher up in the distribution, as compared
with Spain. Furthermore, if we compare the individual characteristics of the
unemployed
7 according to benefit receipt, the most striking figure is the very high
proportion of those aged 45 to 64 among those receiving benefits in Portugal (43% of
those receiving, compared to 19% of those not receiving). This is the group for which
unemployment benefits in Portugal are the most generous.
Such a share of older people among those receiving benefits is very high even
compared to Spain where younger people are less likely to receive benefits because
they are more likely to be on short temporary contracts. Currently in Spain, most of
those who do not achieve benefit entitlement are people who previously held a
temporary contract. The widespread use of temporary contracts is an additional
reason for the reduction in the unemployment benefits coverage rate in Spain since
the end of the 1980s.
                                                
7 We consider here unemployed up to 17 months unemployment.11
In conclusion then, the generosity of unemployment insurance exhibited
important differences prior to the nineties, when the benefits system in Portugal was
virtually non-existent. In Spain, by contrast, the replacement rate was up to 80%
against a background of progressively widening coverage. Since the start of the
nineties, both coverage and the replacement rate have drawn notably closer.
However, there are two factors which mean that the system is generally still more
generous in Spain. First, the entitlement conditions continue to be stricter in Portugal
and, second, the wages used to calculate the benefit amounts are significantly higher
in Spain.
3. Collective Bargaining
Although the regulations governing collective bargaining are very similar, in
practice Portugal shows significant wage flexibility compared to Spain.
In both countries a minimum wage is set each year by law. Additionally
collective bargaining agreements set a starting wage for each of the occupational
categories established in their agreement, which ultimately act as minimum wages.
However, an important difference here between Portugal and Spain is that these wage
floors by categories are set at a much lower relative level in Portugal, giving the
employer much more room for manoeuvre than in Spain. In fact, there is evidence
that actual wages significantly exceed industry-wide agreements in Portugal (see
Aperta, Moreira and Murteira, 1994) but not in Spain. Dolado, Felgueroso and
Jimeno (1997) compare agreed and actually paid wages in Spain and they conclude
that agreed wages are binding for unskilled and semi-skilled workers.
In Portugal, the representation of trade unions and, therefore, their ability to
negotiate agreements depends on the level of trade union membership. The trade-
union structure is characterised by a large number of unions acting in an
uncoordinated fashion. Both these factors weaken the unions’ bargaining power
relative to the employers. Another aspect which limits the power of the unions is the12
fact they depend for their financing on the contributions of their members and
membership is relatively low (31.8% in 1990 according to OECD figures). The
bargaining process terminates in an agreement, which automatically applies to all the
workers in the sector, including those who are not members of trade unions and those
employed by firms which have not participated in the collective bargaining. The
existence of this clause helps explain the current low level of membership. Workers
have little incentive to join a trade union and pay membership dues when, in any
event, they will benefit from the agreements reached. Furthermore, it guarantees an
almost complete coverage for collective bargaining. In Spain, by contrast, the
representation of trade unions is completely independent of their membership and
depends on the support they obtain in union representative's elections. Another
important difference is that once the representation of the trade unions has been
determined according to the votes they have obtained in the trade union elections, the
law provides that only the most representative trade unions are entitled to negotiate,
and an absolute majority is required to reach an agreement. Both factors have led to
the disappearance of minority trade unions. In fact, there are two major unions (UGT
and CCOO) in Spain, which, moreover, co-ordinate their actions. Each is a
confederation of smaller unions that must follow the guidelines set at the national
level. The high degree of centralisation and co-ordination of the trade-union structure
has helped to strengthen the bargaining power of the unions relative to the employers.
Another difference with respect to Portugal which tends to strengthen the power of
the trade unions in Spain is the fact that they are financed not only by the
contributions of their members, but also out of the state budget according to their
representation. As in the case of Portugal, collective bargaining agreements apply
automatically to all the workers and firms of the sector, so that the coverage of
collective bargaining is also practically complete.
Although the structure of collective bargaining in both countries is very
similar, the different representation criteria for unions and the rules governing
authority to negotiate an agreement give rise to trade-union structures which tend to
limit bargaining power in Portugal while strengthening it in Spain. Furthermore, the13
trade-union structure in Portugal hampers the establishment of uniform conditions at
the national level. Using roughly similar sectoral monthly wage data for the two
countries we find that wage increases across sectors in Spain are more homogeneous
than in Portugal. For 1987 and 1988, the coefficient of variation of wage increases is
0.46 and 0.5 for Portugal, and 0.31 and 0.27 for Spain, respectively.
In Portugal wage conditions at the sectoral level are set in terms of levels,
with unions finding it difficult to set wages above the national minimum wage for
low categories. In Spain, by contrast, the greater power of the unions has enabled
wage rates under collective agreements to be well above the national minimum wage,
compressing the wage distribution (overall and by categories). In practice actual
wages tend to coincide with those specified in the collective agreement, especially for
the lower and middle occupational categories, firms not having the same room for
manoeuvre as in Portugal. Moreover, agreements frequently incorporate a very
restrictive interpretation of the wage system by establishing settlements in terms of
agreed wage increases which are applied to the different minimum -and relatively
high- wages set in each collective bargaining agreement. Indeed, although Spain
faces a fragmented collective bargaining structure, in which sectoral agreements at
the regional level predominate, high union co-ordination favours the centralisation of
wage increases, which are in fact closely related to the CPI. As a result, firms find it
very difficult to adapt to the specific circumstances facing them. The automatic
application of the conditions in collective agreements to all the firms of the sector is
particularly damaging when, as in Spain, maximum conditions are in fact agreed
upon instead of minimum. As already mentioned they have restrictive effects on the
lower and middle occupational categories and on smaller firms, which generally do
not take part in the bargaining process but have to comply with the agreement. In
Spain, these rigidities are accentuated by the difficulty of avoiding having to comply
with wider-level bargaining. This would require the agreement of the parties at
narrower levels, which is difficult to achieve because in the event of disagreement the
firms are subject to the wider level agreement. It is even difficult to apply the recently
introduced opt-out clause (1994), which was intended to enable firms in financial14
difficulty to opt out of the wage regime applicable at wider levels. In practice the opt-
out conditions and procedures established have been so stringent that they have
neutralised this flexibility mechanism. Frequently three consecutive years of losses
are required for a firm to be able to activate the opt-out, which generally refers to
wage increases. In Portugal it is not frequent to seek less favourable conditions than
the minimum sectoral-wide agreements. Nevertheless, in this case the negotiation
will proceed with the intermediation of the Ministry of Employment. These
difficulties may explain the low incidence of firm-level collective agreements in both
countries, which are possible, only by setting more favourable conditions than their
corresponding sectoral agreement. In Portugal this type of agreement is found mainly
in public-sector firms.
The much higher wage floors per category agreed at the different bargaining
levels in Spain and the resulting more compressed wage distribution reflects partly
the greater power of Spanish unions. In countries such as Spain and Portugal where
the statutory extension is in force the usual measures of union density are rather
unrepresentative, given the little incentive for workers to join a union when, in any
event, they are going to benefit from their achievements. Note however, that
affiliation is more important for Portuguese unions because their abiliy to negociate
depends on membership, although in both countries the statutory extension creates a
desincentive to join. According to OECD figures, trade union membership in Spain is
lower than in Portugal (31.8% for Portugal and 11% for Spain in 1990), although the
figure is on a marked falling trend in both countries. However, in Portugal we have to
discount for the fact that union membership is close to 100% in sectors where unions
have the monopoly of providing a health support system (banking, insurance, and
telecommunications). A different measure of union power would be to use the
number of wage earners whose remuneration is covered by collective agreements, but
nor is this alternative a realistic approximation to union power in countries where the
statutory extension is the norm. According to this measure, coverage in both
countries is very high.15
Another way of measuring union power is through industrial action. Of all the
OECD countries, Spain ranked second after Greece, and at a great distance from the
other developed countries, as regards industrial disputes. Furthermore, unlike in the
other OECD countries, there was no clear downward trend in industrial disputes in
Spain. Moreover, there is evidence that Spanish legislation is not particularly
permissive compared with most EU countries (see Milner and Metcalf, 1994). In
Spain, days lost due to strikes (deflated by the number of employees) are many times
those in Portugal. In 1986, 1990 and 1995 the number of days lost per thousand
employees was 136.9, 46.1, and 20.7 for Portugal, and 297.7, 263.2, and 161.35 for
Spain, respectively. However few strikes can be associated with both weak or strong
unions. To the extent that employers have knowledge of the unions' capacity to strike
they can avoid the cost of a strike altogether through adequate wage concessions.
Strikes would be just accidents generated by asymmetric information between
employers and unions. In this light, the incidence of strikes is not a faithful indicator
of union power. Having said this, lack of union membership, poor organisation and
weak financial resources may also lead to fewer strikes. To some extent, the main
reason for observing a low incidence and duration of strikes in Portugal is not
because uncertainty is low, but simply because unions are unable to convince workers
to strike.
As for the sources of union power in Spain as compared to Portugal, a number
of institutional factors we have described appear to play a significant role: exclusive
jurisdiction rules in Spain but not in Portugal; co-ordination among unions is higher
in Spain than in Portugal (this is favoured by exclusive jurisdiction); union activities
are publicly financed in Spain but not in Portugal. These rules of play were enacted
by law in Spain as part of the process of political transition to democracy in the late
70s. They came into existence against a background in which workers' unions were
persecuted and their influence was necessarily very limited. So at the time there was
not much experience of unionism but only widespread popular support for union
rights in general terms. Since then discussion about union models and their
implications for welfare and labour market outcomes has been mostly absent from16
Spanish public policy debates. At the time, Portugal was also in transition to
democracy following the 1974 revolution. The legislative outcome on collective
bargaining however was different.
Finally, higher wage settlements in Spain may also reflect differences in
employers' associations between Spain and Portugal. This would be the case if
employers' associations in Spain reflected the interests of large high-wage paying
firms to a stronger degree than in Portugal (due to the massive nationalisation of large
firms in Portugal after 1975).17
III. COMPARING PARTICIPATION, EMPLOYMENT, AND UNEM-
PLOYMENT COMPOSITION
1. Labour force participation and employment
In Spain, female participation increased around ten percentage points since
the mid-1980's, after a prolonged period of stability. However, Portugal also
witnessed such an increase over that period, despite the fact that female participation
started at a much higher level than in Spain for all age groups (see Figure 3).
Therefore, the different unemployment paths of Portugal and Spain cannot be
attributed to differences in female participation between the two countries, not even
from the perspective of the 'lump of labour' hypothesis.
On the other hand, in Spain male participation has been declining
considerably since the 1970's, as in many other European countries, in contrast to
Portugal where there has been a less clear decrease. Therefore, overall, participation
in Spain declined until the mid-eighties and has remained more or less constant since
1985, with the decrease in male participation being compensated by the female
increase, while in Portugal participation has increased since 1973 (see Figure 2).
Related to these increases in female activity, Spain has experienced a sharp
change in the composition of employment which could be thought to generate
adjustment problems, particularly unemployment. The increase in the proportion of
non-manual employment since 1980 for Spain (0.83% per annum) has been one of
the highest of the OECD countries, due to a combination of technological progress
and, more importantly, a growing weight of services (see Bover (1997)). However,
here again Portugal has experienced an even higher growth in its share of non-manual
employment (0.97% per annum). These changes in the demand for labour in both
countries have opened up new opportunities for women, who have seen their market
wage increase. In both countries they have reacted by increasing their participation
and their educational level. Moreover, if we compare the employment shares by18
sector (see Figure 4), it is clear that the dismantling of agriculture has been as severe
for both countries, the rise in services has been similar, and so too have developments
in manufacturing. The share of General Government in the service sector is,
nevertheless, higher in Spain, partly due to the development of the regional
authorities during the 1980s.
There is one feature of the composition of employment which is markedly
different in the two countries, namely the proportion of temporary employees. As we
mentioned in Section II, at the end of 1984, in an attempt to reduce employment
protection, new fixed-term contracts were introduced in Spain, with lower firing costs
than the permanent contracts. This prompted an important increase in employment,
and in the proportion of temporary workers (see Figure 5), reaching well over 30% of
the labour force. This is almost three times the figure for Portugal where the
proportion of temporary work moved between 10% and 13% during the 1990's. As a
consequence of the reform, job turnover increased in Spain (see Dolado, García-
Serrano and Gómez, 1997).
2. Unemployment composition
We now turn to examine to what extent the characteristics of the unemployed
are the same in Spain and Portugal. By sex, the unemployment rate is evenly split in
both countries. Before the mid-1980's in Spain, and the early 1990's in Portugal,
female shares in unemployment rates in the two countries stood at a much higher
level (see Figure 6)
8. Since then, male and female rates have been very similar, with
the female unemployment share being continuously slightly higher in Portugal, while
in Spain for some of the 1990's male unemployment in fact exceeded female
joblessness.
                                                
8 This convergence of unemployment rate shares by sex observed in Figure 6 may be due in part to the
spectacular increase in non-manual employment observed in both countries during those periods, which
was favourable to women. However, there were methodological changes in the Labour Force Surveys in
the two countries precisely at the periods of change. Nevertheless, the Spanish data are homogeneous19
By age (see Figure 7), in both countries young people (aged 20 to 29) account
for most of the unemployment, although their share in Spain is somewhat larger
(41.6% compared to 36.3%). Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in Spain their share
has been decreasing since the mid-eighties, probably due to the introduction of
temporary contracts. The very young (up to 19) have seen their share decrease to the
lowest level (less than 10%) both in Portugal and in Spain, probably as a result of
extended schooling. The most striking fact that emerges from looking at the
unemployment shares by age has been the swift rise in the proportion of unemployed
aged 45 to 64 in Portugal from 1989.
There is one important way in which, until recently, the situation of the
unemployed has been very different in Portugal as compared to Spain, and this is in
the receipt of unemployment income. Indeed, until 1985 the unemployment benefit
coverage in Portugal was very low, well below the Spanish figures (see Figure 8).
Furthermore, even at present eligibility conditions in Portugal are stricter, and the
replacement ratio is less generous during the first 6 months than in Spain. This
difference in generosity would be even more pronounced if it were taken into account
that wages are lower in Portugal, as we shall argue below. Another significant
difference is that in Spain, since 1985, the proportion of assistance benefits to total
coverage has exceeded the proportion of insurance benefits, while in Portugal the
reverse is true since 1989.
During the fifties and sixties, unemployed people in Spain tended to migrate
both abroad and to the more prosperous regions. On the contrary, since the 1980's,
following the expansion of the welfare state, poor and high unemployment regions
(like Andalusia and Extremadura) have become net immigration regions, while the
better-off ones, such as Madrid and Catalonia have become net outmigration regions.
Furthermore, data from the Labour Force Survey for the period 1987-91 reveal that
only 31.2% of the unemployed would accept a job implying a change of residence.
Antolín and Bover (1997) find that the register system at the Spanish Public
                                                                                                                                          
series constructed by the Statistical Office.20
Employment Office (INEM) and, possibly, unemployment benefits, prevent
migration from acting as a mechanism to equilibrate unemployment. We do not have
comparable data for Portugal but, in contrast to Spain, Portuguese high
unemployment agricultural regions such as Alentejo (comparable to Extremadura)
have seen large population losses during the 1980s.
As for emigration abroad, if we take emigrants' remittances relative to GDP as
an indicator, the stock of emigrants abroad has been much higher for Portugal than
for to Spain during the late 1970's and early 1980's. This is in accordance with the
drop in migration flows abroad observed in Spain from the mid-1970's which could
be thought to have contributed to the rise in unemployment at the time. However, in
1975 Portugal experienced the mass immigration of half a million people fleeing the
ex-colonies after independence.
Concerning long-term unemployment, Figure 9 shows that the proportion of
the unemployed who stay unemployed a year or more has followed a surprisingly
similar pattern since the early eighties in the two countries, but at a quite higher level
in Spain (around 55% on average as opposed to 36.2%). Table 2  shows a more
detailed breakdown of the unemployment stock by duration. The difference between
Portugal and Spain is substantial. There is a much higher proportion of long-term
unemployed in Spain which suggests that one of the problems of Spanish
unemployment is long unemployment durations. Comparing the proportions of
long-term unemployed for a "good" and a "bad" year (see Table 2 and the note to the
Table) we see that with adverse conditions the proportion of long-term unemployed
increases in Portugal, while in Spain the reverse happens, with an increased share of
shorter durations due to higher inflows into unemployment. It is important to note
that in Spain, in a good year, around 70% of the unemployed in short durations (less
then a year) come from a temporary job, with the rest coming from
permanent-contract jobs. The latter are responsible for 49% of the unemployment
durations between 12 and 18 months. In a bad year the unemployed with previously
temporary jobs increase their share uniformly in all durations. In the next section we21
shall discuss the factors that may affect unemployment durations and, in particular,
the role of unemployment benefits.
Finally, the flows from employment into unemployment in Spain are 3.5
times those in Portugal (see Figure A.2 in the Appendix), which is the country where
these flows are the lowest among the European Union. These higher flow rates from
employment to unemployment in Spain are mostly the consequence of the turnover
rate of temporary workers in Spain. These inflows into unemployment behave
cyclically, increasing in "bad" years in the two countries.22
IV. FLOWS OUT OF UNEMPLOYMENT
The Portuguese and Spanish quarterly Labour Force Surveys are identical in
many respects. They use similar questions, employ analogous methodologies and
have the same rotation structure. Since each individual is interviewed during six
consecutive quarters, it is possible to obtain from the raw individual records
information about transitions among labour market states (employment,
unemployment, and inactivity). Here we are mainly concerned with transitions out of
unemployment. From the information on elapsed unemployment duration for each
unemployed individual, we can compute the transition rates to employment (or to
inactivity). This can be achieved by simply dividing the number of individuals
reporting a given elapsed duration that move into employment (or inactivity) during
the subsequent quarter, by the total number of individuals with the same elapsed
unemployment duration. Such calculation provides the empirical probability of
exiting unemployment during the next quarter, given that the person has been
unemployed until then.
Computing these conditional probabilities at different durations, we obtain the
empirical hazard function (or exit rates from unemployment), which shows how the
chances of re-employment change as the length of the spell of unemployment
progresses. Non-constant hazard functions are said to exhibit duration dependence. It
is very common to find evidence of declining unemployment hazard rates. A number
of factors may contribute to this outcome. First, skill depreciation during the spell of
unemployment makes the individual less employable. Second, stigmatisation of long-
term unemployed by potential employers leads to decreasing arrival rates of job
offers. Third, discouragement effects lower search intensity. Fourth, unobserved
individual heterogeneity causes “spurious” negative duration dependence because in
the presence of heterogeneous individuals the sample of those still unemployed is
increasingly made up of those workers with unobserved characteristics which make
them less employable.23
We have evaluated empirical hazard rates for comparisons between Portugal
and Spain for a period after the Portuguese reform in 1989. All the hazards are based
on a sample of men aged 20 to 64 for each country. In Figure 10 we present the
empirical hazard functions for Portugal and Spain by the state of destination. Given
the much higher unemployment rate in Spain, it is striking that for the first nine
months or so, the transition rates into employment are higher in Spain. This puzzle
may be partly explained by looking at Figure 11. In Spain, there is a very important
difference between the exit rates to a temporary job and to a permanent one. For the
first nine months, the hazard rate into a temporary post is over four times that into a
permanent one. This is in sharp contrast with Portugal where the hazard rates for the
two types of contract are very similar and in between the Spanish exit rates to
temporary and permanent contracts. The high proportion of temporary contracts in
Spain could in part explain the higher aggregate exit rate in Spain compared to
Portugal. However, at the same time, those exiting unemployment into a
temporary-contract occupation, in high numbers in Spain, will enter again the pool of
the unemployed. It would also be interesting to compare the empirical hazards for
longer durations. In what follows, we will examine empirical hazards by different
characteristics.
The behaviour of unemployment benefits recipients compared with non-
recipients does not differ much between Portugal and Spain (see Figure 12). In both
cases unemployment benefits recipients move to employment at a significantly lower
pace than non-recipients. An analysis of hazard functions by age group (see
Figure 13) indicates, again, a similar pattern between Portugal and Spain that is
coherent with the benefit systems in each country. In both cases, workers aged 20 to
29 do not seem to behave differently from workers aged 30 to 44. Workers aged
between 45 and 64 years face significantly lower probabilities of leaving
unemployment compared with the other two age groups. However, in Portugal this
probability is much lower than for the other two groups (and compared to Spain).
This could be explained by the generosity of the benefit system (in terms of benefit
duration) for older workers in Portugal. These patterns are consistent with the24
empirical hazard functions obtained for different levels of tenure in the previous job
(Figure 14). Workers displaced from long-tenure jobs have much more difficulties in
leaving unemployment than short-tenure workers. However, those coming from very
short-tenure jobs in Spain have a much distinctly higher hazard of leaving
unemployment than those with previously longer tenure as compared to Portugal.
Here again this may be due to the fact that Spanish benefit duration increases with
tenure rather than with age as in Portugal.
Figure 15 shows that in Portugal and Spain individuals who are unemployed
due to the end of a contract move into employment at a faster rate than those that are
looking for a first-job or were dismissed from their last job. However, it seems that
first-job seekers have better prospects of finding a job in Portugal than in Spain. On
the other hand, Spanish unemployed workers that have been dismissed appear to have
initially higher exit rates than their Portuguese counterparts, which probably reflects
the fact that many dismissals in Spain involve people with temporary contracts.
Cyclical downturns and upturns in the economy are expected to affect the out-
flows from unemployment. In Figure 16 empirical hazard functions are graphed for
boom and recession years. As expected, hazard rates are higher when economic
activity is strong and lower when it is weak. However, the impact of the business
cycle is not the same in both countries. For Portugal, the hazard function for 1992
(a "good year") crosses at around twelve months the one for 1995 (a "bad year"). This
does not happen for Spain, where the hazard of leaving unemployment in a good year
(1989) is higher at all durations. A possible explanation is that in Portugal, in a good
year, the unemployed find a job more easily and the ones left with long durations are,
for example, the "less" employable, by some unobserved characteristics. On the
contrary, in a bad year more employable people are left at long durations given the
difficulty in finding employment. This would fit the effect of the business cycle on
the aggregate distribution of durations explained in Section III.
In the previous analysis of empirical hazards we have seen that the factor that25
has the most important impact on exit rates, both in Portugal and in Spain, is whether
the individual receives unemployment benefits or not. To assess how significant
these effects are and to control for personal characteristics and the business cycle, we
estimate an econometric transition model. The estimation results presented in Table 3
indicate that sizeable effects of unemployment benefits remain even after accounting
for observed individual and time heterogeneity. In fact, after insulating the effects of
age, schooling, tenure and sector in the previous job, head-of-household status, and
cyclical and seasonal differences, being a recipient of unemployment benefits reduces
significantly the probability of getting a job in both countries. This effect is higher for
Spain, where the odds of leaving unemployment for those without benefits is 1.8
times those with benefits, than for Portugal where the odds ratio is 1.5 (see columns 1
and 5 in Table 3). The higher effect of unemployment benefits in Spain probably
reflects a higher level of benefit amounts compared to Portugal
9.
The age and tenure coefficient estimates appear to be remarkably similar for
Portugal and Spain. However, unemployment insurance rules differ markedly
between the two countries with respect to maximum duration of benefits. Whereas
for Portugal potential duration of benefits depends solely on the age of the individual
(the older the unemployed the longer the duration of benefits), for Spain the duration
of benefits is determined by the tenure on the previous job (see Table A4). In order to
account for those differences we interacted the age and tenure variables with the
unemployment benefit dummy. The influence of duration of benefits is clearly borne
out in the estimation (see columns 2 and 6 in Table 3). Older individuals receiving
unemployment benefits exit unemployment at a significantly lower rate in Portugal
than in Spain, while individuals with longer tenure in the previous job exit
unemployment at a significantly lower rate in Spain than in Portugal.
In all the previous specifications the coefficients on the elapsed duration
dummies exhibit negative duration dependence. That is, the hazard rates decline over
the spell of unemployment. Human capital depreciation, stigmatisation, or
                                                
9 Note that benefit amounts are not observable at the individual level in the Labour Force Survey.26
unobserved individual heterogeneity may account for this outcome. Nevertheless, the
exhaustion of unemployment benefits (or the decline in replacement rates, as in
Spain) should have, after some critical point, a counter-balancing effect on the hazard
rates. In order to accommodate the possibility of a time-varying effect of the
unemployment benefits we also interacted this variable with the logarithm of elapsed
unemployment duration. In both cases, the effect of unemployment benefits appears
to decline with duration of unemployment, most notably for Spain (see columns 3
and 7 in Table 3). This evidence is consistent with the results provided by Bover,
Arellano, and Bentolila (1996) for Spain, and by Portugal and Addison (1997) for
Portugal.
Finally, the specification presented in columns 4 and 8 from Table 3 allows
for time-varying effects for all the explanatory variables. Two points seem worth
noting. First, this new set of results does not disrupt our previous findings. And
second, comparing the two countries there is an indication that tenure in the previous
job influences the escape rates from unemployment in an opposite way. That is, at the
beginning of the spell of unemployment, tenure in the last job affects negatively the
exit rates in Portugal but this effect fades rapidly over time. For Spain, initially,
tenure impacts positively on exit rates but, again, this effect diminishes as the spell of
unemployment progresses.
From the previous estimations we conclude that at present, both in Portugal
and Spain, receiving unemployment benefits has significant desincentive effects that
reduce substantially the probability of leaving unemployment. Therefore the higher
unemployment benefit coverage in Spain will be producing lower flows from
unemployment to employment in Spain as compared to Portugal. Furthermore, the
estimated desincentive effect is slightly stronger than in Spain.
However, the small estimated difference in the disincentive effects of
receiving benefits on the probability of exiting unemployment coupled with the
current difference in the levels of unemployment benefits coverage between the two27
countries does not seem to be able to explain by itself the current wide difference in
unemployment rates between Portugal and Spain.28
V. WAGES
If we compare the monthly wage distribution for full-time workers for the two
countries (1994 for Portugal, 1995 for Spain, see Figure 17), one important difference
is in the level of wages in the two countries, with wages in Portugal being much
lower on average. If we deflate the average wage in Portugal and Spain by the
corresponding Purchasing Power Parity
10 to eliminate price level differences between
both countries, we obtain 1017.65 for Portugal in 1994 and 1995.84 for Spain in
1995. This is a substantial difference even after taking into account wage increases in
Portugal between 1994 and 1995. The difference is even higher in terms of PPP
deflated median wages, the median wage in Spain being well over twice that in
Portugal.
On the other hand, wage dispersion in Portugal is higher than in Spain. For
full time workers, the ratio of the 90 to the 10 percentile is 4.25 in Portugal and 3.58
in Spain. If we measure dispersion relative to the median (i.e. (90 percentile-10
percentile)/50 percentile), we obtain an even higher dispersion for Portugal (1.96 as
compared to 1.50). Moreover, if we look at other data sets, which are not strictly
comparable to the ones used for Spain in Figure 17, it appears as if wage dispersion
seems to have been increasing more in Portugal than in Spain during the 1980's
11. As
is clear from the figure, the higher dispersion is due to a longer and fatter upper tail in
Portugal, while the bottom 50% of the distribution is more compressed in Portugal
than in Spain. Indeed, the ratio of the 50 to the 10 percentile is 1.65 in Portugal,
lower than the figure for Spain at 1.72.
To study what factors are behind these differences in the overall wage
distributions between the two countries, in this section we do three things. Firstly, we
estimate wage equations for Portugal and Spain using individual data, which allow us
to analyze differences in returns to education, tenure, and type of contract. Secondly,
                                                
10 Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators, May 1997.
11 This information is taken from individual Social Security records over the period 1980-1987 (see
Bover, Bentolila, and Arellano, 1997).29
on the same data, we estimate regressions for the conditional variance of wages in
order to analyze differences in dispersion between the two countries for workers of a
given category. Finally, we compare the distributions of educational categories and
other characteristics in order to see the effect of differences in endowments as
opposed to differences in returns on the position and dispersion of the overall wage
distributions.
The data used for Spain come from the 'Encuesta de Estructura Salarial 1995',
while for Portugal we use the 'Inquérito ao Emprego 1998'. The reason for choosing
this household survey for Portugal was to be able to distinguish between temporary
and permanent contract workers. The data for Spain refer to 1995 which is the only
available wave, while for Portugal the wave we use is 1998 because previously the
wage variable was only available by intervals. Both data sets exclude agriculture and
the Public Sector.
12 In our samples we exclude people in part-time jobs and those
aged less than 18 or more than 60 years old.
The estimated wage equations are reported in Table 4A. It is noticeable that
there are differences in the returns to certain relevant characteristics that are
significant both in statistical and economic terms. In particular, returns to education
are much higher in Portugal while tenure is much more rewarded in Spain.
As for the distribution of educational categories in the two countries, in Table
5A we report the composition of the samples used in estimating the wage equations.
To complement the information on educational levels in the two countries we also
report statistics on the years of education. We can see that education level is higher in
Spain. However, if we look at the distribution of the overall labour force by education
levels which is more relevant to learn about the supply of education, the difference
between the two countries is smaller (see Table 5B). From both Tables 5A and 5B it
                                                
12 The results in this section do not change if for Portugal we use data from 'Quadros de Pessoal' where
information is provided by the employers, as in the Spanish data set, but where information on type of
contract is not provided. We have also checked that the results are robust to using the 1995 wave of the
'Inquérito ao Emprego'.30
is noticeable that the percentage of those with primary education in Portugal is more
than twice that in Spain. In contrast in Spain the fraction of workers with secondary
education is much higher, and so are the fractions of workers with higher levels of
education. Therefore, as far as the effect of education is concerned, the overall higher
average wage in Spain results from a difference in educational endowments and not
from a difference in returns, which act in the opposite direction, since returns to
education are higher in Portugal.
The differences in returns to education between the two countries may be
partly due to the differences in the supply of educated labour, but also to the role of
unions that may exert a stronger pressure towards wage compression in Spain. For
example, Card (1996) shows how unions raise wages more for workers with lower
levels of observed skills and that wage differences between broad skill groups tend to
be compressed in the unionized sectors.
 Average tenure in Spain, although coupled with estimated returns which are
twice as big as the ones in Portugal, is somewhat higher than in Portugal (129 months
as compared to 112 months in our samples). We take this result of very large returns
to tenure in Spain as compared to Portugal as supporting evidence of the stronger
power of the unions in Spain which negociate wage improvements mainly in terms of
tenure rather than productivity.
Temporary workers in Spain earn around 10% less on average as compared to
their counterparts on permanent contracts, while the figure is only 3% less in
Portugal. The segmentation of the labour market in Spain between temporary and
permanent workers may have produced, as argued in Bentolila and Dolado (1994), a
differential wage bargaining power between permanent and temporary employees,
resulting in higher wages for the former. However, since wage increases by
categories in collective agreements apply to all workers in that category regardless of
their type of contract, differences in wages between permanent and temporary
workers may alternatively be attributed to differences in categories (which may31
themselves result from differences in bargaining power, but also from differences in
firm specific skills). A negative effect on wages of the high turnover of temporary
workers is that it prevents them from acquiring firm specific human capital. This
negative effect is likely to be important in view of the high returns to tenure observed
in other countries as well.
It is difficult, however, to identify separate tenure effects for temporary and
permanent workers. If we estimate a tenure effect for temporary workers this
estimation will rely almost by definition on short-tenure observations (while the
reverse is true for permanent workers). If the wage-tenure profile is non-linear (as we
could expect), differences in estimated tenure effects for temporary and permanent
workers will not truly reflect different returns to tenure for permanent vs. temporary
workers.
As for the returns to age, controlling for tenure and type of contract (aside
from the other factors), they are very similar in the two countries.
We now turn to consider regressions for the conditional variance of wages in
order to study the relative within-group wage dispersion between the two countries.
Aside from larger wage differentials between high and low observable skill
categories in Portugal as compared to Spain, we also find larger wage dispersion
within educational categories in Portugal and higher differentials in within-group
dispersion by educational categories in Portugal. This can be seen in Table 4B where
we report the results of a regression of the squared residuals from our wage equations
in Table 4A on the different educational categories. In both countries dispersion
within an educational category increases as education increases but in Portugal the
increments are larger. However, at all educational levels, dispersion within each
educational category is higher in Portugal
13.
From the previous estimates we conclude that in Portugal wages exhibit
                                                
13 This result is robust to separate estimations for temporary and permanent workers.32
greater variation according to both measured and unmeasured skills than in Spain.
Such situation, together with the different unemployment rates between the two
countries, is consistent with the analysis of the different unemployment experiences
of Europe and the US espoused by Murphy (1995) and others. Such view emphasizes
the rigidities in labour market institutions that deter wage dispersion as being
responsible for higher unemployment rates. According to this view the problem is not
that wages are on average too high but that wage dispersion is too low.
Both Portugal and Spain (together with other European countries and the
U.S.) have been subject to common technological shocks that have increased the
demand for skill (see Section III.1). However, it appears that labour institutions in
Portugal have not prevented these changes in labour demand to lead to wages
adjusting, while the role of unions in Spain has limited these wage adjustments,
producing unemployment. Indeed, these changes in labour demand have produced a
decrease in the demand of low skill workers and of the least skilled/able workers
within each skill group. If institutions prevent wages to adjust both across groups and
within groups, the less skilled/able (both across groups and within groups) will suffer
unemployment. We believe this is precisely the case in Spain where wages within
observed skill categories are more uniform as compared to Portugal.33
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we identified three main institutional differences that may be
important for understanding the large disparities in the unemployment rates between
Portugal and Spain.
Firstly, there are differences in unemployment benefits. Before 1985 the
difference was extreme since Spain enjoyed a generous system while in Portugal it
was virtually non-existent. After 1989, although both countries have come closer in
this respect, Spain still has a higher proportion of the unemployed covered by what is
a more generous benefit system. Looking at transition rates out of unemployment, we
have seen that receiving benefits lowers the probability of leaving unemployment in
both countries, but more so in Spain. In Portugal, where benefits are more generous
for older people, the hazard for the unemployed aged 45 to 64 is much lower than in
Spain, and much lower than for the rest of age groups in Portugal. In Spain, where
benefit generosity varies according to tenure, it is mostly short-tenure people, i.e.
temporary workers that have the highest hazards of leaving unemployment.
Secondly, there are important differences in wage flexibility. In Portugal,
wage floors by category established by collective agreements are set at a lower
relative level, and wage increases are less homogeneous across sectors, giving
employers more room for manoeuvre than in Spain.
Finally, it is also the case that in practice firing costs for employees on
permanent contracts in Spain have been higher than in Portugal.
Union power in Spain and their role in the wage setting process does not
result from membership but from the combination of wage bargaining rules and
union representation mechanisms, both of which were enacted by law as part of the
process of political transition to democracy in the late 70s. In contrast, in Portugal,
while the unions in 1974 revolution played an important political and economic role,34
after the 'counter-revolution' they lost most of their power.
Blanchard and Jimeno (1995) concluded that the only difference in the labour
market institutions they could find to explain the substantial difference in
unemployment rates between the two countries was the existence of more generous
unemployment benefits in Spain before the 1989 Portuguese reform. Our results
represent a departure from this conclusion since in addition to unemployment
benefits, we have identified major differences in the wage setting mechanism
between the two countries.
Concerning the role of unemployment benefits, we conclude that current
observed differences in unemployment benefit coverage are not large enough to be
able to explain by themselves the wide unemployment rate difference, given our very
similar microeconometric estimates on the impact of benefit entitlement and other
factors affecting the probability of leaving unemployment at present in the two
countries.
One consideration related to employment protection we should bear in mind is
that the low unemployment equilibrium in the Portuguese labour market is associated
with weak worker flows. In such case, stringent employment protection, by
eliminating desirable separations, may have important efficiency losses on output and
welfare (Blanchard and Portugal, 1998).
Concerning the functioning of collective bargaining, our analysis reveals a
greater role of Spanish unions in pushing for higher and, more importantly, more
uniform wage agreements by skill category. This is borne out in our individual wage
equations and our regressions for the conditional variance of wages by educational
categories. These show that at present wages in Portugal exhibit greater variation
according to both measured and unmeasured skills as compared to Spain.
Given the increase in the demand of skilled labour resulting from skill biased35
technological change, the high wage floors by category set in Spain, together with the
resulting more compressed wage distribution -both across and within observed skill
categories-, hampers the employment probabilities of workers with low productivity
(both overall and relative to their observed skill level), even if they have low
reservation wages. First-time job seekers have a more difficult time in finding
employment in Spain than in Portugal, and the unemployment share of the young is
higher in Spain.
Thus, we tentatively come to the conclusion that the key factor in explaining
the different Portuguese and Spanish unemployment experiences since the late
seventies is the behaviour of the wage setting institutions. By preventing wage
dispersion to adjust in the face of changing demand for observed and unobserved
skills, the Spanish labour market exhibits less wage inequality among the employed
than the Portuguese, but a much greater incidence of unemployment.
The wage setting process experienced by Spain would have been less
sustainable without generous benefits and strong employment protection of
permanent employees, but given the way union rules developed it would be hard to
argue that causality runs exclusively from benefits towards union behaviour and wage
setting outcomes. Thus, we do not see the role of unions in the wage setting process
in Spain as just a consequence of the larger unemployment benefits.36
DATA APPENDIX
A.1. Data Base Description for Portugal
1. Information relating to long-term labour market series (unemployment rates,
and sectoral employment) is obtained from "Séries Longas", Banco de
Portugal (1997); the unemployment rate series from 1992 to 1996 is obtained
from the Labour Force Survey (INE).
2. Information on the composition of the stock of unemployed and on incidence
of fixed-term contracts was gathered from the "Inquérito ao Emprego",
Instituto Nacional de Estatística (1983-1996).
3. Aggregate data on wages (private-sector wage settlements, wage growth, and
minimum wages) are taken from the Banco de Portugal annual reports.
4. Empirical hazard rates and the flows between employment, unemployment
and inactivity, and regression estimates for the econometric transition model
were computed from the individual records of the "Inquérito ao Emprego",
Instituto Nacional de Estatística for mainland Portugal over the period 1992-
96. Average figures for wages by type of contract are also obtained from that
source for 1996.
5. The empirical wage distribution was estimated using the individual records
from the "Quadros de Pessoal" survey, Ministerio para a Qualificaçao e o
Emprego (March, 1994).
6. Earning indices by characteristics come from the "Enquadramento Estatístico
dos Activos - Anuário das Estatísticas Sociais", Statistics Department of the
Ministry of Employment.37
7. Unemployment benefit coverage was obtained dividing the number of benefit
recipients as reported from the Social Security Services (at December each
year) by the number of registered unemployed from the Public Employment
Services. 
8. Participation rates are defined as the ratio of Active Population (starting at 15)
to Population aged 15 to 64 (OECD).38
A.2. DATA BASE DESCRIPTION FOR SPAIN
Unemployment rate: Source: from 1987II, "Encuesta de Población Activa" (EPA),
Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE); before 1987II, García-Perea and 
(1994)
Participation rates: Population in the labour force, (starting at 16). Source: OECD 
  Total population, aged 15 to 64
Employment by sectors. Source: from 1987II, EPA, INE; before 1987II, García-




Market services: total employment in services minus employees in general
government
General government: employees in public-sector firms and institutions
Fixed-term contracts: Source: EPA, INE
Unemployment by sex: Source: EPA, INE
Unemployment by age: Source: EPA, INE
Unemployment duration: Source: EPA, INE
Unemployment benefit coverage: Insurance and assistance benefit,
Registered unemployment
where,
Insurance benefits exclude part-time unemployment. Source: "Boletín de39
Estadísticas Laborales". Ministry of Employment.
Assistance benefits and registered unemployment include the special scheme
for seasonal agricultural workers in Andalusia and Extremadura. Source:
Ministry of Employment.
Minimum wage: Source: "Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales". Ministry of
Employment
Monthly wage distribution: Source: "Encuesta de Estructura Salarial 1995" (INE)
Wage indices by characteristics: Own calculations based on "Encuesta de
Estructura Salarial 1995", INE.
Real wage settlements:    Wage settlements  
     Consumer Price Index
Wage settlements: wage settlement increase agreed in collective bargaining before
including the inflation-adjustment safeguards. Source: "Estadística de convenios
colectivos de trabajo". Ministry of Employment and Social Affairs
Real monthly wage:      Monthly wage    
Consumer Price Index
Monthly wage: regular payments of monthly earnings, by employee. Regular
payments exclude arrears due to inflation-adjustment safeguards and other payments
of a periodicity greater than one month. Source: "Encuesta de Salarios 1995". INE.Table 1A: Comparison of Selected Labour Market Indicators
1996
Portugal Spain
Unemployment rate 7.3% 22.2%
Long-term unemployment 42% 55.2%
Part-time contracts 8.7% 7.5%
Fixed-term contracts 12.5% 33.8%
Self-employment 20.6% 25.1%
Participation rate 72.6% 60.3%
Unemployment Benefit Coverage 39.6% 54.4%
Minimum wage (as a percentage of average wage) 42.6% 31.2%
Wage 90 percentile/10 percentile
1 4.2 3.6
Note: 1. 1994 data for Portugal and 1995 data for SpainTable 1B: Cross-country regression results, Nickell (1997)




















































   Note: 1. t-ratios in parentheses. The change in inflation and a 1989-94 dummy were also included.Table 2
UNEMPLOYMENT DURATIONS
as a % of total





Portugal 1992 27.7 21.0 20.5 15.7 15.3
Spain 1989 15.6 11.7 14.3 17.8 40.7
"Bad Year"
Portugal 1995 16.0 17.0 21.4 25.2 20.4
Spain 1992 18.2 15.7 18.7 18.2 29.2
Note: The choice of "good" and "bad" years is influenced by the availability of LFS individual data (1992-96 for Portugal and
1987-94 for Spain).
In Portugal 1992 and 1995 are, respectively, the years with the lowest (4.1%) and the highest (7.2%) unemployment rates,
although GDP growth was 1.7% in 1992 and 2.3% in 1995. In Spain unemployment was comparatively low in 1989 (17.3%)
and high in 1992 (18.4%), with GDP growth at 4.1% in 1989 and at -1.9% in 1992.Table 3: ESTIMATES OF LOGISTIC HAZARDS
1





































Benefits x tenure x log Dur - - - -0.018
(0.50)
















2 x log Dur - - - 0.001
(1.53)
- - - -0.001
(3.77)












Benefits x Age 25-29 x log Dur - - - -0.007
(0.02)
- - - -0.026
(0.51)












Benefits x Age 30-44 x log Dur - - - 0.233
(0.81)
- - - 0.141
(3.09)












Benefits x Age 45-64 x log Dur - - - -0.046
(0.15)


















Age 25-29 x log Dur - - - -0.063
(0.43)


















Age 30-44 x log Dur - - - -0.257
(1.75)


















Age 45-64 x log Dur - - - -0.265
(1.37)
- - - -0.230
(5.76)
















Tenure x log Dur - - - 0.072
(3.26)




















2 x log Dur - - - -0.003
(3.51)


















Secondary Education x log Dur - - - -0.201
(2.06)


















University Education x log Dur - - - -0.112
(0.37)
- - - 0.039
(0.85)
















Head of household x log Dur - - - -0.018
(0.16)
- - - -0.048
(2.34)Table 3: ESTIMATES OF LOGISTIC HAZARDS (cont.)

















Manufacturing x log Dur - - - -0.058
(0.41)


















Construction x log Dur - - - -0.154
(1.06)


















Services x log Dur - - - 0.096
(0.68)
- - - 0.061
(2.43)










































































































































Number of parameters 47 52 53 69 50 55 56 72
Number of spells 5699 5699 5699 5699 90717 90717 90717 90717
Average Log likelihood -0.421 -0.420 -0.419 -0.417 -0.526 -0.525 -0.523 -0.522
Notes:
1. t-ratios in parentheses.
2.   In all the specifications reported we include monthly duration dummies for spells up to 24 months and quarterly duration













































































1.Eight comparable economic sector dummies are included for the two countries, aside from the
constant; heteroskedasticity consisten t-ratios in parentheses.
Table 4B: Within Groups Wage Dispersion.



































(24.58)Table 5A: Mean of the relevant wage regression variables (from the samples used

































































Subjective factors related to employees Company circumstances unrelated to
the employees
Disciplinary Failure to adapt
Portugal • Employee's culpable







adapt to changes in the
nature of his work caused
by the introduction of a
new technology
•Dismissal of one up to four
employees (depending on
whether the firm has less or more
than fifty employees) due to
economic reasons
•Cases in which employer terminates, either simultaneously or within a 3-month period, the
contract of employment of at least 2 or 5 employees (depending on whether the firm employs
less or more than 50 workers), on the grounds of permanent closure of the firm. Shut-down of
one or more of its plants, or the need to reduce the workforce for structural, technological or
economic reasons





a)Prior to 1994 reform
•When there is a need to eliminate a
single redundant job position in
firm with fewer than 50
employees
b)1994 reform
•Economic causes: justifiable in
terms of the need to make a
staffing adjustment to help




ensure the future viability of the
firm and jobs via a more
appropriate organisation of
resources. Since 1997 it is also
possible when the firm faces a
lack of competitiveness
a)Prior to 1994 reform
•Technological, organisational and production-related causes. No minimum threshold for number
of workers for dismissal to be considered as collective
b)1994 reform
•Economic, technological, organisational and production-related causes when the number of





Disciplinary Failure to adapt or company circumstances
unrelated to the employees
• Prior to the dismissal the employer
has to assess the existence of a fair
cause as well as give the employee
an opportunity to defend himself
against the allegation made. This is
an essential requirement for the
validity and lawfulness of the
dismissal which may otherwise be
ruled null and void
• Law lists the circumstances under
which dismissals are null. These
are: (1) failure to notify the intent
of dismissal; (2) disrespect for the
employees' right to self-defence;
(3) non-compliance with the
obligation of issuing a written and
circumstantial notice of dismissal
• Firms with 20 employees or less as
well as their workers are exempt
from certain mandatory procedures
•Mandatory procedures are similar to the
ones applying to collective dismissal and
include advance notice to both the
employee and the workers' commission
of the impending dismissal. Dismissal
will only be pronounced after the
workers' commission has issued an
appraisal of the impending dismissal and
the worker has been given the
opportunity to dispute allegations made
•Law defines the terms for invoking the
failure to adapt clause. These include
persistent reduction of productivity or of
product quality, repeated breakdown of
equipment, and safety hazards. This type
of dismissal can only occur after six
months have elapsed since the
introduction of the changes originating
inadaptation and after adequate training
has been provided and time allowed for
adaptation.
Law also requires that all employees
dismissed due to failure to adapt must be
replaced within 60 days of dismissal
•Should notify the workers' commission as well as the Ministry of Employment of
the impending dismissal. Notice must present the financial and/or technical
reasons originating the dismissals, as well as a list of the workforce and the
criteria to be used in selecting the employees to be dismissed and their
occupational categories. A stage of negotiation between the employer and
employee's representatives follows. This is aimed at agreeing on the terms of
carrying out the dismissals and on the adoption of alternative measures (e.g.,
lay-offs, short-time working, re-training or early retirement).
After agreement has been reached or 30 days elapsed since first notice of
impending dismissals has been given, each employee concerned must be given
a written notice of dismissal at least 60 days in advance.
•Currently, the law does not stipulate any criteria for selecting employees to be
dismissed; however, trade union representatives and members of working
commissions are explicitly given preference for continued employment;
collective agreements can establish other selection criteria
•Employees affected by collective dismissals are entitled to certain rights, namely:
time off to look for another job; financial compensation (one month's pay for
each year of employment with the firm, subject to a minimum of three months'





Disciplinary Failure to adapt or company circumstances
unrelated to the employees
•Written communication to
the employee expressing
the causes and the date it
will take effect.
•Need to demonstrate to the
labour magistrate that the




•Written communication to the employee
expressing the causes
•Need to demonstrate to the labour magistrate the
dismissal causes
•Deposit, on behalf of the employee, of the
severance payment of 20 days per year of
service, with a maximum of 12 monthly
payments
•Allow employees 6 hours per week during
advance-notice period to look for work
•Need to submit a copy of the notice of dismissal to
employee representatives
•Agreement between employer and trade unions, which requires majority
acceptance.
•Communication to the labour authorities of the outcome of the agreement.
The labour authorities issue a resolution
•Written communication to the trade unions representatives concerning the
causes prompting the application for the labour force reductions.
•In firms with fifty or more employees, a plan outlining measures must be
attached to alleviate the consequences and enable the continuity and
viability of the corporate project
•The employer has to initiate consultation proceedings with the legal
representatives of the employees
•The employee may appeal against the termination decision
•The legal authorities may declare the dismissal fair, unfair or null and void
•The dismissal will be considered unfair if the alleged cause is not proved
•The dismissal will be null and void when the underlying motive is one of the causes
of discrimination prohibited under the Spanish constitution or law or when it
occurs with a breach of fundamental right and public liberties. Before 1994 reform
the null and void dismissal occurred when formal requirements were not observedTable A3
FINANCIAL COSTS (measured in terms of number of months' wages [mw])
PORTUGAL SPAIN
Notice given 2 m a) Prior to 1994 reform (1-3m)
b) 1994 reform (1m)
Severance pay:
Fair, by number of
years worked
one month's wages per
year worked
20 days' wages per year worked
• 9 months 3 mw 0.5 mw
• 4 years 4 mw 2.6 mw
• 20 years 20 mw 12 mw
• max there is no maximum 12 mw
Unfair, by number of
years worked
one month's wages per
year worked
45 days' wages per year worked
• 9 months 3 mw 1.1 mw
• 4 years 4 mw 6 mw
• 20 years 20 mw 30 mw
• max there is no maximum 42 mw
Indirect cost a) Prior to 1994 reform
•wages payable pending a legal ruling and
potential appeals lodged by the firm (on
average 4 months' wages)
b) 1994 reform
•If the employer acknowledges that the
dismissal is unfair in conciliation, the
employee is only entitled to receive the
wages payable pending the legal ruling
from the date of dismissal to that of the
conciliation, this being on condition that
the employer places the severance
payment at the employee's disposal,
depositing it with the court in the 48
hours following the conciliation.
•The foregoing obligation of the employer to
pay the employee wages is lifted while
the appeal lodged by the firm against the
sentence declaring the dismissal to be
unfair runs its course.Table A4
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS
PORTUGAL SPAIN
1985 1989 1984 1992
Eligibility Individuals must have been
employed continuously in the
last 3 years
Individuals must have been employed for
at least 18 months during the previous 2
years
Individuals must have been
employed for at least 6 months
during the previous 4 years
Individuals must have been
employed for at least 12 months
during the previous 6 years
Maximum length No limit
12m+ one additional month
for each year of tenure
In terms of age
      age <25 ﬁ 10m
25£ age <30 ﬁ 12m
30£ age <35 ﬁ 15m
35£ age <40 ﬁ 18m
40£ age <45 ﬁ 21m
45£ age <50 ﬁ 24m
50£ age <55 ﬁ 27m
55£ age       ﬁ 30m
In terms of months of tenure
 6m£  <12m ﬁ  3m
12m£  <18m ﬁ  6m
18m£  <24m ﬁ  9m
24m£  <30m ﬁ 12m
30m£  <36m ﬁ 15m
36m£  <42m ﬁ 18m
42m£  <48m ﬁ 21m
‡48m          ﬁ 24m
In terms of months of tenure
12m£  <18m ﬁ 4m
18m£  <24m ﬁ 6m
24m£  <30m ﬁ 8m
30m£  <36m ﬁ 10m
36m£  <42m ﬁ 12m
42m£  <48m ﬁ 14m
48m£  <54m ﬁ 16m
54m£  <60m ﬁ 18m
60m£  <66m ﬁ 20m
66m£  <72m ﬁ 22m
‡72m          ﬁ   24m
Replacement ratio 65% 65% 1-6m   ﬁ 80%
7-12m  ﬁ 70%
13-24m ﬁ 60%
1-6m  ﬁ 70%
7-24m ﬁ 60%
Minimum amount 100% Min w 100% Min w 100% Min w  75% Min w  no dependents
100% Min w  dependents
Maximum amount 300% Min w 300% Min w 170% Min w  no dependents
195% Min w  1 child
220% Min w  >1 child
170% Min w  no dependents
195% Min w  1 child
220% Min w  >1 childTable A5. UNEMPLOYMENT ASSISTANCE BENEFITS
PORTUGAL SPAIN
1985 1989 1984 1989
Eligibility All unemployed whose households
do not have monthly per capita
income of more than 70% of the
minimum wage and who do not
qualify for regular benefits
a) They exhausted their regular
benefits
b) They were employed for at least 6
months in the previous year
All unemployed, whose
households do not have monthly
per capita income of more than
80% of the minimum wage, who
do not qualify for regular
unemployment benefits.
a) They have already received
these benefits for a time-period
equal to its maximum duration
b) They were hired as employees
for at least 6 months but less than
18 months, in the previous year
All unemployed with income
no higher than the minimum
wage, with family 
responsibilities and who do
not qualify for regular
unemployment benefits
a) They have already received
these benefits
b) They were hired as
employees for at least 3
months but less than 6 months
c) They are over 55
All unemployed with income no higher than 75% of
the minimum wage and who do not qualify for regular
unemployment benefits.
a) They have already received these benefits and have
family responsibilities or are over 45.
b) They were hired as employees for at least 3 months
(with family responsibilities) or 6 months (with no
dependents), but less than 12 months.
Maximum
length
a) 15 m  age < 50
b) 18 m  50 £ age < 55
c) 24    age ‡ 55
The same as for legal
unemployment benefits, unless
social unemployment benefits are
due after legal benefits have been
received. In this case, duration is
half of the above-mentioned. For
workers over 55, social
unemployment will be paid until
they reach the age of 60.
a) 18m
b) 3-5m according to tenure
c) indefinite
a) In terms of the period receiving insurance benefit
 <6m and age>45 and dependentsﬁ 24m
 >6m and age<45 and dependentsﬁ 24m
         age>45 and dependentsﬁ 30m+6m
(1)
>12m and age>45 and no dependentsﬁ 6m+ 6m
(1)
>12m
(2)and age>52 and no dependentsﬁ indefinite
b) In terms of months of tenure
1-2m ﬁ 0
3-5m ﬁ according to tenure
6£  < 12m ﬁ 6m and up to 21m with dependents
Replacement
ratio
 70 % Min w no dependents
 80% Min w 1 or 2 dependents
 80% Min w 3, 4 or 5 dependents
100 % Min w  6 or more dependents
 70% Min w   no dependents
 90% Min w 1,2 or 3 dependents
100% Min w   ‡4 dependents
75%  Min w  75% Min w   Age<45
 75% Min w   Age‡45  1 dependent
100% Min w   Age‡45  2 dependents
125% Min w   Age‡45 >2 dependents
(1) If they have received contributory benefits for 24 months.
(2) Must have contributed at least 6 years during their working life.Table A6.1
Comparing unemployment benefits entitlement for different individuals
(before 1989)
Individual characteristics
PORTUGAL SPAIN (since 1984)
Maximum length Replacement Ratio Maximum
length
Replacement Ratio
1.Unemployed with 6 or more years tenure, less than 45 and
dependents
I: 12 m + 1 m for
each year of tenure
65% I: 24m 80%  1-6m
70%  7-12m
60%  13-24m
A:15 months 80% - 100% according to the
number of dependents
A: 18m 75% Min w
2.As case 1. but with no dependents I: 12 m + 1 m for
each year of tenure
65% I: 24m 80%  1-6m
70%  7-12m
60%  13-24m
A: 15 months 70% -- --
3.Unemployed with 6 or more years tenure, more than 45
and dependents
I: 12 m + 1 m for
each year of tenure
65% I: 24m 80%  1-6m
70%  7-12m
60%  13-24m
A: 15 months 80% - 100% according to the
number of dependents
A: 18m
(1) 75%  Min w
4.Unemployed with 2 years tenure, less than 45 and
dependents
I: -- - I: 12m 80%  1-6m
70%  7-12m
A: 15 m 80% - 100% according to the
number of dependents
A: 18m 75%  Min w
5.Unemployed with 1 year tenure and dependents I: - - I: 6m 80%  1-6m
A: 15 m - 24 m 80% - 100% according to the
number of dependents
A: 18m 75%  Min w
(1) Indefinite for unemployed over 55
I: Insurance benefits entitlement
A: Assistance benefits entitlementTable A6.2
Comparing unemployment benefits entitlement for different individuals
(Current situation)
Individual characteristics





1. Unemployed with 6 or more years tenure,
less than 45 and dependents
(*) I: 10-22m 65% I: 24m 70%  1-6m
60%  7-24m
A: 5-11m 90%  Min w A: 24m 75%  Min w
2. As case 1. but with no dependents I: 10-22m 65% I: 24m 70%  1-6m
60%  7-24m
A: 5-11m 70%  Min w -- --
3. Unemployed with 6 or more years tenure,
more than 45 and dependents
I: 24-30m 65% I: 24m 70%  1-6m
60%  7-24m
A: 12-15m 90%  Min w A: 36m
(1) 100%  Min w
4. Unemployed with 2 years tenure, less than
45 and dependents
I: 10-22m 65% I: 8m 70%  1-6m
60%  7-8m
A: 5-11m 90%  Min w A: 24m 75%  Min w
5. Unemployed with 1 year tenure and
dependents
-- -- I: 4m 70%  1-4m
A: 10-30m 90%  Min w A: -- age <45             
24m age >45
--
100%  Min w
(*) 1, 2 or 3 dependents for Portugal, 2 dependents for Spain.
(1) Indefinite for unemployed over 52, even without dependents.REFERENCES
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